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Access to Grand Jury Material*
In the course of their civil law enforcement efforts, administrative agen-
cies frequently seek materials that were presented to federal grand juries.
Agencies request these materials, which include witness transcripts, sub-
poenaed documents, and government memoranda, to conserve resources by
obviating the need for repetitious administrative investigations.1 Grand
jury proceedings are secret,' however, and access to these materials is re-
stricted by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).' This Rule states
* The authors wish to thank Mr. Charles Walsh, who first drew their attention to the problem
addressed in this Note.
1. Agency requests for grand jury materials have attracted much judicial attention during the past
year. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving an Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) request: In re Special Feb., 1975 Grand Jury, 662 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Baggot, 102 S. Ct. 2955 (1982) (No. 81-1938). In addition, the
Judicial Conference of the United States has proposed changes to the Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure governing agency access to grand jury materials. See infra note 78.
2. Although grand jury investigations are conducted in secrecy, see infra pp. 1618-19, agencies
often learn about such proceedings. In the vast majority of cases, federal agents conduct extensive
investigations before the evidence is presented to a grand jury. Usually a United States Attorney, with
the assistance of other federal agents, will construct the bulk of his case before seeking an indictment
from the grand jury. For example, in the formative stages of a case, the federal agents may gather
information through search warrants. These warrants are court documents and are generally available
for public (and agency) inspection. Often agencies themselves instigate grand jury investigations by
bringing matters uncovered during agency inquiries to the United States Attorney's attention. Fur-
thermore, United States Attorneys increasingly request agency assistance in presenting cases to grand
juries, thereby revealing some information about ongoing investigations. See infra note 21 (discussing
provision under which United States Attorneys may obtain such assistance).
"Leaks" are not uncommon. Grand jury witnesses are under no obligation of secrecy. The media
commonly uncover and report about inquiries into organized crime and political corruption. Also, the
United States Attorney might disclose some information about an ongoing investigation to prevent
interim harms. For example, disclosing that a particular investment scheme is under grand jury inves-
tigation will warn potential victims about its possible risk. Interviews with Jeremiah Donovan and
Kurt Zimmerman, Assistant United States Attorneys, District of Connecticut, in New Haven, Con-
necticut (Feb. 2 & 12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Interviews].
When a grand jury returns an indictment, of course, targets and charges are identified publicly. An
agency then will know whether dbtaining access to grand jury materials will aid subsequent agency
investigations.
3. ' Rule 6. The Grand Jury
(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings
(2) General Rule of Secrecy.-A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of
a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the govern-
ment, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision
shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in
these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with
this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to-
1614
Access to Grand Jury Material
that "matters occurring before the grand jury" may not be disclosed unless
pursuant to specified exceptions.4
Administrative agencies usually base their disclosure requests on an ex-
ception to the rule of secrecy that permits disclosure "when so directed by
a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."5
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty;
and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the govern-
ment to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to
enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this para-
graph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the attor-
ney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal
law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court, before which
was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the
persons to whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before
the grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be
made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
Rule 6(e) does not impose an obligation of secrecy upon grand jury witnesses. A witness may
disclose, publicly or privately, both his own testimony and whatever information was revealed to him
in the course of his examination before the grand jury.
4. FED. R. CRJM. P. 6(e)(2). If the requested materials do not constitute "matters occurring before
the grand jury," then they are not subject to the secrecy requirement. A body of case law permitting
disclosures has developed around this phrase. The leading case is United States v. Interstate Dress
Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960), wherein the court declared:
[Ilt is not the purpose of the Rule to foreclose from all future revelation to proper authorities
the same information or documents which were presented to the grand jury. Thus, when testi-
mony or data is sought for its own sake-for its intrinsic value in the furtherance of a lawful
investigation-rather than to learn what took place before the grand jury, it is not a valid
defense to disclosure that the same information was revealed to a grand jury or that the same
documents had been, or were presently being, examined by a grand jury.
Id. at 54 (citations omitted).
Disclosure on grounds of "intrinsic value" has been allowed infrequently. The few recent cases
permitting such disclosure include In re Grand Jury Investigation of Uranium Indus., 1979-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,798 (D.D.C. 1979); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp.
1299 (M.D. Fla. 1977); United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The first
two cases involved disclosure requests of congressional committees; the third case dealt with a Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) request. In each instance only documents, not testimony, were released.
The Judicial Conference of the United States is currently considering amendments to rule 6(e) that
would overrule the lenient "intrinsic value" disclosure doctrine. See infra note 78.
5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). Three other exceptions to the rule of secrecy are set forth in
rule 6(e). First, rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) permits access to grand jury material by an "attorney for the gov-
ernment for use in the performance of such attorney's duty." This exception to grand jury secrecy has
been construed to apply to those persons named in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(c), which
defines "attorney for the government" as "the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attor-
ney General, a United States Attorney, [or an] authorized assistant of a United States Attorney .... "
See In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F.
Supp. 197, 199-202 (E.D. Pa. 1962). But see Sells, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 1184, 1188-90
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that attorneys in United States Attorney's civil division are not "attorney[s]
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Courts have interpreted this exception to require demonstration of a "par-
ticularized" and/or a "compelling" need for disclosure that outweighs the
need for grand jury secrecy.8 Often, however, courts deny the disclosure
requests of administrative agencies for one or both of the following rea-
sons: 1) administrative agency proceedings are not "judicial," and 2) ad-
ministrative agency proceedings are not "preliminary to" judicial proceed-
ings. Thus, the issue of whether an agency has demonstrated the requisite
need is often not reached.
This Note argues that the "preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding" provision' of Rule 6(e) does not adequately balance
the goals served by agency access against those promoted by grand jury
secrecy. It shows that the framers of the "judicial proceeding" provision
did not consider the issue of administrative agency access to grand jury
materials and that courts have applied this provision to agencies in an
inconsistent and sometimes undesirable manner. The Note suggests
amending Rule 6(e) to allow a case-by-case analysis of disclosure re-
for the government"), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2034
(1982) (No. 81-1032).
The rule refers only to attorneys for the federal government and not to state or municipal attorneys.
Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing cases). Attorneys for federal ad-
ministrative agencies similarly are not included among those who might be given access under the
"attorney for the government" standard of rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i). In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d
440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Attorneys for corporations owned by the United States are also excluded from the scope of this stan-
dard. United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (disclosure denied to
attorneys for Tennessee Valley Authority).
Second, rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) permits access to grand jury material to administrative agency personnel
who assist the United States Attorney in preparing criminal cases. This exception was added in 1977
to allow federal prosecutors to use the expertise of agency personnel in the grand jury investigations of
sophisticated white collar crime. See infra note 21.
Finally, rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) permits disclosure by the court to a defendant who demonstrates that
"grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the
grand jury."
6. The Supreme Court's statements regarding the "particularized" and "compelling" need re-
quirement were put forward in cases where disclosure was sought by private litigants. See Douglas
Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 n.12 (1979) (applying "particularized need"
standard to private plaintiffs in civil antitrust action); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395, 400 (1959) (applying "particularized need" standard to defendants in criminal price-fixing
action); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (applying "compelling
necessity" standard to defendants in civil antitrust suit). Private litigants must demonstrate a compel-
ling need for disclosure that outweighs the public interest in grand jury secrecy. In addition, disclosure
requests from private litigants must be "particular," so that grand jury secrecy may be lifted discretely
and narrowly. The Court has never addressed the issue of whether a public agency must meet the
same standard as a private litigant. See infra notes 17, 90.
Some lower courts have blurred the distinction between "compelling" and "particularized" need,
suggesting that meeting either standard may justify disclosure. See United States v. Brummitt, 503 F.
Supp. 852, 854 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (disclosure requires "showing of particularized need or compelling
necessity"), aff'd, 665 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2244 (1982); United States v.
Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 454 F. Supp.
281, 285 (W.D. Mo. 1978); ef In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (S.D.
Fla. 1974) (disclosure requires "particularized need amounting to a compelling necessity").
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
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quests, balancing the need for grand jury secrecy against the sometimes
compelling need for agency access.
I. The Tension Between Grand Jury Secrecy and Agency Access
Administrative agency requests for grand jury materials create a tension
between the need for grand jury secrecy and the need for agency access to
information. When a court denies an administrative agency's request for
grand jury materials, grand jury secrecy is preserved but inefficiency re-
sults, because agencies are forced to use their resources to do work that
has already been done. Granting agency requests for grand jury material,
on the other hand, promotes efficiency but may reduce the efficacy of fu-
ture grand juries.
A. The Need for Grand Jury Secrecy
The grand jury is frequently described as an institution designed to
function both as a "shield" and a "sword."' It functions as a shield by
screening the prosecutor's case to ascertain whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to justify bringing charges against the accused.9 The grand jury also
serves as a sword, combating crime through the use of its investigative
authority. In this role, it seeks to uncover evidence and thereby to increase
the likelihood of successful prosecutions. 0
The grand jury is granted a wide range of powers with which to carry
out these functions.1" It may, for example, compel the production of evi-
dence and the testimony of witnesses without regard to the procedural and
evidentiary rules that govern criminal trials.1" Also, grand jury witnesses
8. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 n.1 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (describing
grand jury's role as "protective bulwark" between ordinary citizen and overzealous prosecutor).
9. See In re Dymo Industries, 300 F. Supp. 532, 535 (N.D. Cal.) ("The very existence of the
grand jury process serves as a deterrent against unwarranted accusations by the prosecuting agency."),
afl'd, 418 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 937 (1970). But see Hawkins v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 586 P.2d 916, 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 438 (1978) ("[Tlhough legally
free to vote as they please, grand jurors virtually always assent to the recommendations of the prose-
cuting attorney . . . ."). For a summary of the debate over the effectiveness of the grand jury in
reviewing the prosecutor's evidence, see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1019-22 (5th ed. 1980).
10. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 712. See generally id. at 713
(discussing special effectiveness of grand jury investigations into such areas as political corruption,
price fixing, gambling and narcotics distribution).
11. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (Grand jury is "grand inquest, a
body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly . . . .") (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) ("Because (the grand jury's] task is to inquire into the existence of possible
criminal conduct and to return only well-founded indictments, its investigative powers are necessarily
broad."). See generally M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS, THE GRAND JURY 52-59 (1977) (discussing
grand jury's wide range of powers and potential for oppression).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (grand jury may act on tips, ru-
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are subjected to the psychological pressure of grand jury interrogation
without the benefits of such procedural protections as the representation of
counsel" and the right to transcripts.14
The Supreme Court has recognized consistently that ongoing grand
jury proceedings must be kept secret.1 5 It has noted several distinct inter-
ests served by safeguarding the confidentiality of such proceedings. Grand
jury secrecy encourages witnesses, who might otherwise be hesitant, to
appear voluntarily before the grand jury. Similarly, secrecy protects wit-
nesses from retribution and inducements to perjury, thereby promoting
full and frank disclosure. Secrecy minimizes the disclosure of information
to grand jury targets, making flight less likely. It also prevents the impor-
tuning of individual grand jurors to vote against the indictment. Finally,
secrecy assures that persons who are accused but ultimately not indicted
will not be subjected to unfavorable publicity.
Courts have noted, however, that some of the interests served by grand
jury secrecy become less important after the grand jury investigation has
ended and the accused has been either exonerated or indicted and ar-
rested.1" There is then no longer a risk that witnesses before the grand
jury will be improperly influenced or that the grand jury itself will be
inhibited from pursuing its investigation. In addition, the probability that
an accused will flee diminishes after his arrest. For these reasons, the Su-
preme Court has held that a party seeking disclosure of grand jury mater-
ials need satisfy a lesser burden after the grand jury investigation has been
completed."7
mors, or personal knowledge of its members); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)
(grand jury may consider hearsay evidence); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906) (grand jury
target need not be formally charged for investigation to proceed); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79-80
(2d Cir.) (grand jury may subpoena material having "conceivable relevance to any legitimate object of
investigation"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 238
F.2d 713, 719-20 (4th Cir. 1956) (grand jury may consider immaterial evidence), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 981 (1957).
13. See United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955); In
re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931). A witness may leave the room to consult with his attorney.
See United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969).
14. See Comment, Grand Jury Secrecy: Should Witnesses Have Access to Their Grand Jury
Testimony as a Matter of Right?, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 804 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979); United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958); see also United States v. Rose, 215
F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954).
16. In re Disclosure of Testimony, 580 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury, 583
F.2d 128, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
234 (1940) ("[A]fter the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends
of justice require it.").
17. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979); see also U.S. In-
dus., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 345 F.2d 18, 21-22 (9th Cir.) ("if the reasons for maintaining
secrecy ... apply to only an insignificant degree," party seeking disclosure need not demonstrate a
large compelling need), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 106, at 173 (1969). The Supreme Court allows disclosure of grand jury material to
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But since two reasons for secrecy-protection of the innocent accused
and prevention of retaliation against witnesses-usually retain their vital-
ity even after the grand jury investigation has ended, 8 the secrecy re-
quirement is merely relaxed, and not eliminated, when the investigation
ends. In addition, the Supreme Court has cautioned courts to consider not
only the immediate effects of disclosure upon a particular grand jury but
also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries. 9 Each
disclosure potentially deters those who would come forward and aid fu-
ture grand juries, because persons called to testify will consider the likeli-
hood that their testimony one day may be disclosed to outside parties.
private litigants upon a three-fold showing: that the material was needed to avoid a possible injustice
in another proceeding, that the need for disclosure was greater than the need for continued secrecy,
and that the disclosure request was structured to cover only the material so needed. Douglas Oil, 441
U.S. at 222. Such a showing typically is made when private litigants seek to use a grand jury tran-
script at trial to refresh a witness's recollection or to test his credibility. Id. at 222 n.12. Disclosure is
then justified "to avoid misleading the trier of fact." Id. Such disclosure is limited to "those portions of
a particular witness' testimony that bear upon some aspect of direct testimony at trial." Id.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether a government agency seeking disclo-
sure must make the same showing as is required of private litigants. Many lower courts apply a
reduced standard when a government agency seeks grand jury materials. The Fourth and Fifth Cir-
cuits have adopted the most lenient standard of need for agency requests, requiring only that the
grand jury materials sought are "rationally related" to the civil matters the government is investigat-
ing. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 581 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971
(1979); In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1978); In re December 1974 Term Grand
Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 751 (D. Md. 1978).
A few courts, however, have suggested that the government must demonstrate the same degree of
need as private litigants and have denied disclosure requests for failure to meet this standard. Sells,
Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The showing of a rational relationship
between the [grand jury] materials and the civil proceeding may explain the Government's desire for
disclosure, but it does not help determine the degree of necessity."), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982) (No. 81-1032); In re United States Order Pursuant
to Provisions of Rule 6(e), 505 F. Supp. 25, 27 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (relevance is "merely a minimal first
step" toward showing particularized need). Given the public interest inherent in an agency's disclo-
sure request, this approach is questionable. See infra note 90.
In a special class of cases, some courts have dropped the need requirement altogether. Under 15
U.S.C. § 15(f) (1976), a state Attorney General may request investigative files of the Justice Depart-
ment for use in the state's antitrust suit. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have recently held that grand
jury testimony is included as part of the investigative files and that a state does not have to show need
to obtain grand jury material. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 943 (1981); United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.
1980). Contra In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981); In re
Illinois Petition, 659 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs.,
Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1708 (1982) (No. 81-1114).
18. See, e.g., Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 774-75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889
(1977); U. S. Indus., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 345 F.2d 18, 22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965); In re Cement-Concrete Block, 381 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (N.D. Il. 1974). But c. In
re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1978) (less likely that innocent person will suffer
injury to reputation after investigation is completed); Government Brief in Support of Petition for
Rehearing at 12, Sells, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[P]rotection of innocent
accused" rationale loses vitality with respect to corporation when corporate officers have been indicted
and plead guilty.), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982)
(No. 81-1032).
19. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).
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B. The Argument for Agency Access
Federal statutes generally grant administrative agencies considerable
power to compel the production of documents and the testimony of wit-
nesses when the disclosure of such information is necessary to carry out
the rulemaking, policymaking, and adjudicatory functions that are dele-
gated to agencies by the legislature.2 Grand juries often subpoena docu-
ments and testimony that would facilitate administrative agency investiga-
tions. In addition, grand juries frequently receive reports, prepared by
administrative agency personnel, that analyze and evaluate testimonial
and documentary evidence."' Such reports could also be valuable in subse-
quent agency proceedings. Often administrative agencies request these
materials to avoid the time and expense involved in duplicating a com-
pleted investigation.2" When agencies are forced to begin every investiga-
20. Detailed provisions, however, may vary from agency to agency. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 46
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (FTC investigatory powers limited in certain areas) with I.R.C. § 7602
(West 1982) (IRS given wide-ranging summons power). For a comprehensive survey of the investiga-
tive authority of administrative agencies, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4 (2d ed.
1978).
The investigatory powers of administrative agencies are more limited than those of the grand jury.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 581 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (4th Cir. 1978) (grand jury obtained
documents after IRS subpoena was quashed), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Note, Administrative
Agency Access to Grand Jury Materials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 175-82 (1975) (comparing admin-
istrative agency powers with grand jury powers and arguing increased agency access to grand jury
materials may result in "undesirable expansion of agency power"). But cf United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (administrative agency's investigative powers "analogous" to
those of a grand jury).
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (empowering government attorneys to use agency personnel
in grand jury investigations). Agency personnel can gather and present to prosecutors information
relating to criminal behavior. S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 530. More important, the prosecutors often utilize the expertise of
agency personnel in evaluating and analyzing evidence before presenting it to grand juries. Id.
Even before rule 6(e)(3)(a)(ii) was enacted in 1977, courts recognized the need for agency assis-
tance in grand jury investigations. See, e.g., Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue,
406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (allowing administrative agency personnel to assist grand jury
investigation by analyzing and evaluating documents because of their resources and expertise); In re
William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (same). But cf United States v.
Tager, 638 F.2d 167, 169-70 (10th Cir. 1980) (disclosure to private insurance investigator improper).
22. This problem is particularly acute for the IRS, which contributes significant resources to as-
sist attorneys for the government in grand jury litigation, particularly tax investigations involving
narcotics trafficking and other racketeering activities. Statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, before the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Judicial Conference of
the United States (Feb. 10, 1982) (on file with Yale Law Journal). At the end of 1981, the IRS was
assisting in 1,148 grand jury investigations of targets suspected of underpayment of taxes or illegally
obtaining income. Id.
Criminal tax investigations typically are complex and often involve thousands of evidentiary items
which, only after thorough analysis, reveal a tax fraud and underlying tax liability. Statement of
Robert P. Ruwe, Director, Criminal Tax Division, and Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service,
before the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 10,
1982) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Ruwe Statement].
A grand jury investigating the General Motors Corporation, for example, subpoenaed between
200,000 and 300,000 pages of material which were "stamped, numbered, and analyzed by attorneys
for the government together with IRS agents assisting them." In re April Grand Jury Proceedings,
506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Mich. 1981). In another tax investigation, the grand jury subpoenaed
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tion de novo, they not only waste resources but also risk statute of limita-
tions problems.23 Under the secrecy restrictions of Rule 6(e), however,
such materials are usually unavailable to the agencies.2
Effective civil law enforcement and efficient administration require that
the government make full use of available evidence. During their investi-
gations, grand juries often receive evidence of significant civil liabilities.
Public policy argues strongly in favor of lifting the veil of secrecy that
covers such evidence.
II. The Judicial Proceeding Provision: An Inadequate Solution
Courts have relied heavily upon the "judicial proceeding" provision of
Rule 6(e) to resolve the tension between the need for agency access to
information and the need for grand jury secrecy. This provision, however,
was not drafted with administrative agencies in mind. Thus, its applica-
tion to agency disclosure requests has yielded inconsistent and unsound
results.
A. Legislative History
An analysis of the legislative history of Rule 6(e) reveals that the Advi-
sory Committee that drafted it did not consider the impact that the Rule
would have on administrative agencies. This omission is understandable,
in part, because administrative law was relatively undeveloped when the
over 12,000 checks and 5,000 petty cash vouchers which were "inspected and traced" through corpo-
rate records by IRS personnel. Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp.
1098, 1113 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Denying disclosure requests by the IRS may result in complete reinvestigation and analysis by
different agents who have not previously been involved in the grand jury investigation. The result is
the loss of time and government resources, if the analysis can be duplicated, or, if the analysis cannot
be duplicated, the loss of revenue to the government, which may total millions of dollars. See Petition
of the United States for Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co.), 518 F. Supp. 163,
168 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (government seeking disclosure because "some of the material may no longer
exist"), afi'd in part, rev'd in part, 687 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1982).
In addition to wasting the resources of administrative agencies, duplicating grand jury investigations
may unduly burden third parties. See id.; see also In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir.
1978) (disclosure obviates "needless duplication of effort" by third parties).
23. In some cases, the loss of time might preclude civil law enforcement entirely. For instance, in
Sells, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Sells Eng'g, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982) (No. 81-1032), the government sought grand jury material
in connection with a civil action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), and a common law action to recover overcharges the defendant had obtained from the Navy.
The government's need to review the grand jury material was based partly on the possible running of
statutes of limitation. Government Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 2.
24. See In re Special Feb., 1975 Grand Jury, 662 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981) (analysis prepared
by agent covered by rule of secrecy because it incorporates grand jury testimony), cert. granted sub
nom. United States v. Baggot, 102 S. Ct. 2955 (1982) (No. 81-1938); Interviews, supra note 2; Ruwe
Statement, supra note 22. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 505 F. Supp. 978, 981-82 (D. Me.
1981) (FBI reports incorporating documents not covered by rule 6(e)).
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were enacted in 1946.25 Comments
by its members indicate that the Advisory Committee was concerned pri-
marily with regulating grand jury disclosure to defendants who wanted to
challenge their indictments. 6 Indeed, the Advisory Committee's Note ac-
companying Rule 6(e) cites only cases dealing with disclosure to criminal
defendants.27
The Committee was also silent on the intended function of the "judicial
proceeding" provision. The most likely source of this provision is Section
126 of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure (ALI
Code). 8 Section 126 was a model oath for grand jurors, which permitted
disclosure only "in the due course of judicial proceedings."29 Perhaps the
drafters of Rule 6(e) appropriated the phrase, intending to adopt the
ALI's codification of the common law.
25. Although agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and FTC had been con-
trolling the anticompetitive conduct of monopolies and other powerful corporations since the turn of
the century, and a great proliferation of administrative agencies occurred during the New Deal, see K.
DAVIS, supra note 20, § 1, cases discussing agency access to grand jury materials appeared infre-
quently prior to the 1970's. The Advisory Committee received only one comment during the drafting
period concerning rule 6(e)'s impact on administrative agencies, that of Richard S. Rubin, Special
Counsel to the Securities and Exchange Commission, who stated:
I would like to urge the Committee to change the present Rule 6 (e) so as to permit disclo-
sure of such matters in connection with federal administrative proceedings. In the same con-
nection I think it should be noted that the phrase "judicial proceeding" might be construed to
include state court proceedings, and I have some question as to whether that would be
desirable.
4 United States Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Comments, Rec-
ommendations, and Suggestions on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12 (1944) (unpublished
manuscript, available in Yale Law School Library).
26. See NEW YORK UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH
NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 154 (1946) (comments of Judge Medalie) (new rule would
"directly and expeditiously" enable criminal defendants to challenge their indictments); Dession, New
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 203 (1947) (provision for disclosure
"designed to save time and facilitate proof where a motion to dismiss an indictment is made in good
faith"). Judge Medalie and Professor Dession were members of the Supreme Court Advisory Com-
mittee that drafted the Federal Rules.
27. The original rule 6(e) stated in pertinent part:
[A] juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the
grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before
the grand jury.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (1946).
28. The ALI Code, published in 1931, compiled and codified the common law of criminal proce-
dure of various states. The Advisory Committee relied on the ALI Code as a legislative model. In fact,
specific citations to the ALI Code appear in the Notes on rule 6(e) in the preliminary drafts of the
Federal Rules. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25 (1943) (preliminary draft).
29. Section 126 of the ALI Code, entitled "Oath of grand jurors," states in pertinent part: "You
will keep your own counsel and that of your fellows and of the State [Commonwealth or People], and
will not, except when required or permitted in the due course of judicial proceedings, disclose the
testimony of any witness examined before you . . . ." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE § 126 (Official Draft 1930) (emphasis added).
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Yet the ALI Code itself, in section 145,3 preserved the traditional dis-
cretion of the courts to disclose grand jury material "in the furtherance of
justice," even in the absence of judicial proceedings.3" Thus, section 145
was a declaration of substantive judicial power much broader than the
mere oath for grand jurors in section 126. The two sections should prop-
erly be read together as a codification of the "traditional practice" of se-
crecy.32 By appropriating only the wording of section 126, the drafters of
Rule 6(e), inadvertently perhaps, limited the traditional discretion of the
courts with regard to grand jury disclosure. 3
Another possible explanation for the "judicial proceeding" provision is
that the drafters intended it to limit the issuance of grand jury reports. At
common law, grand juries would investigate conditions that affected the
30. Section 145 of the ALI Code, entitled "Testimony not to be disclosed-exception," states:
No grand juror, prosecuting attorney, stenographer or interpreter shall disclose the testimony
of a witness examined before the grand jury or other evidence received by it except when
required by a court to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury for
the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that of the witness given before the
court, or to disclose the testimony given before the grand jury by any person upon a charge
against such person for perjury in giving his testimony or upon trial therefor, or when permit-
ted by the court in the furtherance of justice.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUE, supra note 29, at § 145 (emphasis added).
31. Although most cases that allowed disclosure pursuant to the "traditional practice" did involve
pending judicial proceedings, disclosure did not turn on the existence of such proceedings. See Annot.,
127 A.L.R. 272 (1940). Indeed, two cases that relied upon the "traditional practice" permitted disclo-
sure of grand jury material in administrative settings. See People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Board of
Supervisors, 251 N.Y. 156, 167 N.E. 204 (1929) (permitting grand jurors, before whom county dis-
trict attorney had presented case, to testify before county administrative board, which was considering
whether citizen who had petitioned governor for removal of district attorney should be reimbursed by
county for related expenses); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1933)
(releasing materials pursuant to hearing on revocation of brewing company's permit, and indicating
that whether materials were sought by a court or an agency was immaterial). In the latter case, an
"interest of justice" test was applied. Id. at 284.
32. The "traditional practice" of secrecy has been said to permit disclosure "in the furtherance of
justice." See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1939); see also In re United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940) (permitting disclosure "where the ends of
justice require it"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933) (permitting
disclosure "whenever the interest of justice requires").
Even in the absence of Section 145, a construction of the ALI Code (and rule 6(e)) that preserves
the "traditional practice" would be in keeping with numerous early twentieth century cases that
broadly construed narrow statutory exceptions to grand jury secrecy. Many such statutes, for example,
limited grand jury disclosure to two instances: 1) impeachment of a witness at trial, and 2) evidence in
the perjury trial of a grand jury witness. Courts, however, generally held that these statutes were only
partial declarations of the common law, not intended to interfere with "traditional practice," which
allowed disclosure "in the furtherance of justice." See, e.g., Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334, 375-77,
47 N.E. 157, 170 (1897) (permitting disclosure in criminal trial); United States v. McDonald, 4
Alaska 630, 638-42 (1913) (permitting disclosure in bail hearing); People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Board
of Supervisors, 251 N.Y. 156, 171, 167 N.E. 204, 210-11 (1929) (permitting disclosure in administra-
tive hearing).
A few federal courts have used a similar approach in construing rule 6(e). See In re Report &
Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C.), mandamus denied sub
nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974); In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.
1952); infra p. 1631.
33. But see Note, Federal Agency Access to Grand Jury Transcripts Under Rule 6(e), 80 MICH.
L. REV. 1665, 1674 (1982) ("preliminarily to" phrase adopted to relax secrecy requirement).
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morals, health, sanitation, or general welfare of their communities and
issue nonindicting, although sometimes critical, reports." ' A substantial
body of caselaw supported this practice as long as the reports focused on
general areas of public concern." When reports discussed individuals,
however, courts expressed concern with providing the targets of the re-
ports forums in which to rebut the charges levied against them.,
Perhaps, then, the "judicial proceeding" provision was placed in Rule
6(e) to insure that grand jury material would not be disclosed unless any
person hurt by the disclosure would have a forum in which to defend
himself. 7 But courts have not construed the "judicial proceeding" provi-
sion as a limitation on their authority to release grand jury reports. In-
stead, they have adopted a broader approach reminiscent of the "tradi-
tional practice" of secrecy that permitted disclosure "in the furtherance of
justice" and have released reports even in the absence of judicial proceed-
ings."8 On the other hand, courts continue to deny most disclosure re-
quests by administrative agencies even though administrative hearings can
provide adversarial forums to individuals where they may defend
34. The purpose of these reports was to arouse public attention and legislative indignation. See In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973) (collecting cases).
35. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186-90 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing history of grand jury reports and collecting cases), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). But see In re
Report & Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-26 (D.D.C.)
(noting that authority of federal grand juries to issue reports remains unsettled), mandamus denied
sub nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
36. See Judge Weinfeld's oft-cited opinion in United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers, 111 F.
Supp. 858, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (recognizing that "reports of a general nature touching on conditions
in the community . . . may serve a valuable function and may not be amenable to challenge," but
disapproving of accusatory pronouncements that publicly condemn and yet bar their victim from a
judicial forum in which to clear his name); see also People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 333, 266
N.Y.S. 363, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ("A [report] is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial
document; yet it lacks its principal attributes-the right to answer and to appeal. It accuses, but
furnishes no forum for denial."); . Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2nd Cir. 1958) (citing
United Elec. Workers in distinguishing between disclosure in an adversary context and grand jury
report).
37. Cf Note, supra note 20, at 174-75 (noting potential for circumvention of secrecy requirement
through grand jury reports). Although some courts have suggested a connection between grand jury
reports and rule 6(e), see, e.g., Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Report &
Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C.), mandamus denied sub
nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers,
111 F. Supp. 858, 865-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), neither courts nor commentators have suggested that
curbing grand jury reports was the raison d'&re for the "judicial proceeding" provision.
38. In re Grand Jury January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970), for example, involved a
report that was publicly released in summarized form after the court had noted the rampant specula-
tion about the report and had weighed "the public interest in disclosure" against "the private
prejudice to the persons involved, none of whom are charged with any crime in the proposed indict-
ment." Id. at 679. The court further observed that, if materials are released, "[tihe Court should
regulate the amount of disclosure, to be sure that it is no greater than is required by the public
'interest in knowing' when weighed against the rights of the persons mentioned in the presentment."
Id. at 678; accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1973); se also
infra p. 1631 (discussing "Watergate" disclosure case).
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themselves.3 9
In sum, the source and purpose of the "judicial proceeding" provision is
unclear. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the provision was
intended to resolve the tension between administrative agencies' need for
information and grand juries' need for secrecy.
B. Judicial Application
The "judicial proceeding" provision of Rule 6(e) has two conceptually
distinct components: the "preliminarily to or in connection with" compo-
nent and the 'judicial proceeding" component.40 In evaluating requests
for disclosure, most courts have attempted to apply the literal require-
ments of the judicial proceeding provision. In some cases, however, this
approach has been ignored and a public interest standard has been used
instead.
1. Literal Approach
Doe v. Rosenberry4' was the first case to distinguish clearly the two
components of the judicial proceeding provision. 4' The issue in the case
was whether grand jury minutes should be made available to the Griev-
ance Committee of the New York City Bar Association.'3 Judge Learned
39. See infra note 48.
40. The "preliminarily to or in connection with" phrase itself contains two components. The
word "preliminarily" is applicable to future proceedings; the words "in connection with" apply to
current judicial proceedings. Courts, however, have not been concerned with this subtlety.
41. 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958).
42. Two cases decided in 1952 involving disclosure requests from administrative bodies illustrate
early disagreement over the meaning of the "judicial proceeding" provision. In United States v. Cro-
lich, 101 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Ala. 1952), the court declared that the "judicial proceeding" phrase
contemplated "a proceeding pending in a District Court which would necessitate the disclosure of
matters occurring before a grand jury empaneled by that court." Id. at 784. Thus the Crolich court
refused to release grand jury testimony concerning corrupt electoral practices to a municipal board
that appointed election officials. This narrow construction, were it consistently followed, would effec-
tively bar disclosure to any administrative agency.
In In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1952), by contrast, the court broadly construed the
"judicial proceeding" provision as a codification of the traditional practice of secrecy. The court de-
clared, "by way of interpretation [of the rule], the Federal Courts have extended their jurisdiction so
that they may remove the seal of privacy from Grand Jury proceedings when in the Court's discretion
the furtherance of justice requires it." Id. at 641. Thus, in Bullock, a police disciplinary board suc-
ceeded in having grand jury testimony of a department inspector, suspected of misconduct, made avail-
able to its outside advisory committee. Id. at 643.
Crolich's narrow construction has been followed by only one district court. See United States v.
Downey, 195 F. Supp. 581, 584 (S.D. Ill. 1961). The Downey interpretation has been overruled, sub
silentio, by the Seventh Circuit. See Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973) (permit-
ting disclosure of policemen's grand jury testimony to superintendent of police).
Bullock's liberal intepretation of rule 6(e) generally has been confined to similar fact patterns. See
Conlisk, 490 F.2d at 897. Disclosure in such instances has been permitted because of the strong public
interest in maintaining the "integrity and credibility" of the police department. Id. at 898. This policy
argument, while a factor in the Bullock opinion, was not dispositive in that case.
43. After investigating charges of corruption in government, the grand jury did not indict the
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Hand affirmed the disclosure order of the lower court because (i) the
Committee investigation was preliminary to charges being brought before
the bar's disciplinary body, the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court,"" and (ii) the Appellate Division proceeding was a "judicial
proceeding."
45
Judge Hand tailored a definition of "judicial proceeding" to fit the facts
of the case:
[P]rima facie, the term "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding
determinable by a court, having for its object the compliance of any
person, subject to judicial control, with standards imposed upon his
conduct in the public interest, even though such compliance is en-
forced without the procedure applicable to the punishment of
crime.46
This definition has dominated judicial discussions of the "judicial pro-
ceeding" provision. Courts regularly deny disclosure requests by adminis-
trative agencies because administrative hearings are not "determinable by
a court."47 Strict adherence to Judge Hand's definition seems questiona-
ble, however, as many administrative hearings are quasi-judicial, 8 and
target of the investigation, a member of the New York City Bar. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d at 119. The
jury, however, unanimously voted that the activities of the attorney be referred to the Grievance Com-
mittee. Id.
44. The question of whether the Grievance Committee's investigation was preliminary to the dis-
ciplinary proceeding, according to Judge Hand, "admits of no doubt." Id. at 120. Hand found both
statutory and judicial support for the proposition that the settled practice of referring complaints
against attorneys to a bar grievance committee satisfied the "preliminarily to" requirement. Id. at 120.
Subsequent cases have relied on this aspect of Rosenberry in permitting disclosure to bar and police
disciplinary bodies. See infra note 50.
45. 255 F.2d at 120.
46. Id.
47. In re United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (adjudicatory hearing before
Federal Maritime Commission regarding possible violations of Shipping Act not a judicial proceed-
ing); In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1980) (hearings before Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding utility rates "are not quasi-judicial but, rather,
are purely administrative"); In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 132-33 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(adjudicatory hearing before Department of Labor regarding citation by Mine Safety and Health
Administration not a judicial proceeding).
48. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), in holding that absolute immunity heretofore en-
joyed by federal and state judges should be extended to administrative law judges, provided a pithy
comparison of the judicial and the administrative process:
[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same safe-
guards as are available in the judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in nature. See 5
U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976 ed.). They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political
influence. See § 554(d). A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence,
§ 556(d), and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute
the exclusive record for decision. § 556(e). The parties are entitled to know the findings and
conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record. § 557(c).
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing examiner or adminis-
trative law judge within this framework is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge.
Id. at 513.
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Judge Hand himself indicated that a broader definition of judicial pro-
ceeding might be appropriate.49
In contrast to the widespread application of Judge Hand's "judicial
proceeding" definition, his lenient approach in Rosenberry to the "prelim-
inarily to" component has been followed only in cases involving bar griev-
ance and police disciplinary hearings.50 Another early case, In re Grand
Jury Proceedings,51 provides the touchstone for analyzing the "prelimina-
rily to" requirement in other contexts. This case involved a disclosure re-
quest from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which was investigat-
ing possible violations of its cease and desist orders. If the FTC found
such violations, it was required by statute to notify the Attorney General,
who in turn was required to institute an enforcement proceeding in fed-
eral court.52 Yet the Third Circuit denied the FTC's request, stating that
"[ft]here is no judicial proceeding now pending and it is possible that none
may result from the investigation.""3
Subsequent decisions have continued to require varying degrees of cer-
tainty that judicial proceedings will follow the administrative investigation
before grand jury material is disclosed. 54 For instance, the mere possibility
of judicial review of an administrative decision has not satisfied this cer-
tainty requirement. 55 Thus, the "preliminarily to" component of the "ju-
dicial proceeding" provision is inconsistently applied: grand jury material
49. After defining a "judicial proceeding," Judge Hand stated, "An interpretation that should not
go at least so far, would not only be in the teeth of the language employed, but would defeat any
rational purpose that can be imputed to the Rule." Rosenberry, 255 F.2d at 120 (emphasis added).
Hand's cautious language may be explained by the fact that this was the first federal appellate consid-
eration of an administrative agency disclosure request under rule 6(e).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 766 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Rosenberry for
proposition that bar grievance committee meets "judicial proceeding" requirement); Jachimowski v.
Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1973) (disclosure to police board of inquiry); United States v.
Salanitro, 437 F. Supp. 240, 243-44 (D. Neb. 1977) (disclosure to bar disciplinary body, judicial
disciplinary body, and local prosecutor), afld sub nom. In re Disclosure of Testimony, 480 F.2d 281
(8th Cir. 1978). These bodies also benefit from a lowered "particularized need" standard. See supra
note 17; infra note 90.
51. 309 F.2d 440 (3rd Cir. 1962).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1976).
53. 309 F.2d at 444.
54. See, e.g., In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1980) (disclosure
denied because "possibility of [FERC] enforcement proceeding is remote"); In re Disclosure of Testi-
mony, 580 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (administrative proceeding must be "designed to culminate"
in judicial proceeding); Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1117 (7th Cir. 1975) (judicial pro-
ceeding must be "reasonably anticipate[d]"); Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir.
1973) (disclosure proper where statutory scheme "plainly contemplates" judicial review of administra-
tive decision); In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 132 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (must be "clear
pathway" from administrative process to judicial process); In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury
Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 751 (D. Md, 1978) (administrative investigation must have "some
rational connection with a specific existing or contemplated judicial proceeding").
55. In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 132-33 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (denying disclosure
because judicial review of Department of Labor's decision limited to "substantial evidence" standard);
United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (denying disclosure because judicial
review of state board of medical examiners' decision was "a remote potentiality").
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is regularly disclosed to agencies such as bar and police disciplinary bod-
ies,56 despite the often tenuous link between these investigations and ulti-
mate judicial resolution,5" but is withheld from most other agencies, re-
gardless of the likelihood of judicial review of their decisions. 8
The application of the "preliminarily to" component of the "judicial
proceeding" provision is inconsistent even within a single agency, the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS sometimes requests disclosure of
grand jury material to facilitate its conduct of a civil tax audit. Several
courts have denied these requests on the ground that they are not prelimi-
nary to a judicial proceeding.59 In In re Special February, 1975 Grand
Jury (Baggot),0 for example, the Seventh Circuit denied an IRS request
for grand jury material pertaining to the civil tax liability of James Bag-
got, who had pled guilty to fraudulent commodity trading. It ruled that a
tax audit was "too embryonic, speculative, and uncertain to firmly say
56. See, e.g., Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973) (disclosure to police discipli-
nary body); United States v. Salanitro, 437 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1977) (disclosure to four separate
administrative bodies charged with investigating misconduct of public officials), aifd sub nom. In re
Disclosure of Testimony Before Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1978). But see United States v.
Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764 (2nd Cir. 1980) (denying disclosure to bar association committee because of
failure to show particularized need).
57. For example, a bar disciplinary committee may decide not to bring a court action. Or, where a
disciplinary committee takes disciplinary action without resorting to court, a "judicial proceeding"
would not take place absent an appeal. See Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir.
1973) (stating that policeman would have right to raise issue of disclosure on appeal). A target of such
action may forego his right to appeal; cf infra pp. 1629-30 (discussing taxpayer's right to appeal in
IRS cases and effect on disclosure).
58. Courts and commentators have noted that the distinction is illogical. See In re Judge Elmo B.
Hunter's Special Grand Jury, 667 F.2d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 1981) ("no substantial difference" between
IRS request and those of bar committee and police disciplinary bodies); Note, supra note 20, at 172
("Few sensible distinctions" can be drawn between police and bar disciplinary body requests and
other administrative agency requests.); cf In re Report & Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand
Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D.D.C. 1973) ("[lt seems incredible that grand jury matters should
lawfully be available to disbarment committees and police disciplinary investigations and yet be un-
available to the House of Representatives in a proceeding of so great import as an impeachment
investigation."), mandamus denied sub nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But
cf. Note, supra note 33, at 1669-72 (attempting to organize rule 6(e) cases along two lines: likelihood
of judicial proceedings as matter of fact and as matter of law). The arbitrariness of the results under
the "preliminarily to" requirement is well-illustrated in a recent Third Circuit case, In re Grand
Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1982), which involved the disclosure request of a state district
attorney. Faced with two inconsistent and seemingly irreconcilable lines of cases-the bar and police
disciplinary body cases (employing a lenient "preliminarily to" standard) and the other agency cases
(employing a stringent standard)-the court likened the district attorney's request to the former, stat-
ing simply: "The prosecutorial discretion to refrain ultimately from making a charge is not the type of
contingency which renders the likelihood of future judicial proceedings too embryonic to provide the
predicate for a disclosure . . . ." Id. at 65. This pronouncement is nothing more than an ipse dixit:
the potential prosecution could just as easily have been termed too speculative, and the request denied.
59. In re Special Feb., 1975 Grand Jury, 662 F.2d 1232, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted
sub nom. United States v. Baggot, 102 S. Ct. 2955 (1982) (No. 81-1938); In re April 1977 Grand
Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (E.D. Mich. 1981); In re 1978-1980 Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 503 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
60. 662 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Baggot, 102 S. Ct.
2955 (1982) (No. 81-1938).
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that it is 'preliminarily to' a judicial proceeding.""1 Even if an IRS audit
uncovers a tax deficiency, the court reasoned, the taxpayer may choose to
pay the assessed deficiency rather than challenge it in a subsequent judi-
cial proceeding. Thus, these two contingencies-whether the IRS would
uncover a deficiency, and whether the taxpayer would challenge
it-brought the disclosure request outside the ambit of the "preliminarily
to" requirement.6"
There are two problems with the Seventh Circuit's approach. First, it
does not adequately distinguish the line of cases beginning with
Rosenberry, which permits disclosure to bar association and police disci-
plinary bodies.6 s Each of those cases presents the same dual contingency
found in Baggot. the investigating authority may conclude there has been
no wrongdoing, or the subject of the investigation may not contest the
adverse action.6 4 Second, the Baggot decision presents the IRS with a
"Catch-22": the taxpayer's assertion that he will not litigate any defi-
ciency that is determined becomes the reason for denying the IRS disclo-
sure of information necessary to determine the tax deficiency."'
Perhaps recognizing these problems, other courts have granted IRS re-
quests identical to those denied in Baggot."6 In In re Judge Elmo B.
61. 662 F.2d at 1239.
62. Concern about the likelihood of a subsequent judicial proceeding has led one court to consider
a wide range of variables. In a case involving General Motors' tax liability, In re April 1977 Grand
Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (E.D. Mich. 1981), the court's denial of an IRS disclo-
sure request rested on (i) uncertainty about whether a deficiency would be proposed, (ii) the history of
non-litigation between General Motors and the IRS, (iii) the financial advantages to General Motors
in negotiating a settlement, (iv) the unmanageability of litigation about this particular area, and (v)
the undesirability of litigation from General Motors' public relations standpoint.
63. See supra note 50.
64. The court's effort at distinguishing the case from Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th
Cir. 1973) (disclosure to Chicago police board) and In re Disclosure of Testimony, 580 F.2d 281 (8th
Cir. 1978) (disclosure to bar and judicial disciplinary bodies) is unsuccessful. The court notes the
"quasi-judicial" administrative hearing present in Conlisk-a policeman could appear with counsel,
present witnesses and evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and obtain a record of the hearing-and
states: "In the present case we have no comparable situation." Baggot, 662 F.2d at 1239. The "quasi-
judicial" nature of the hearing, however, was not the basis of the Conlisk court's determination that
the hearing was preliminary to a judicial proceeding; rather the court looked at the entire "statutory
scheme involved" and determined that judicial review was "plainly contemplate[d]." Conlisk, 490
F.2d at 897. The Baggot court never explains why judicial review of an IRS tax assessment is less
plainly contemplated than judicial review of a police board's disciplinary action. As for its attempt to
distinguish Disclosure of Testimony, the Baggot court merely states that the proceedings involved in
that case were "designed to culminate in a judicial proceeding," without explaining why the IRS tax
assessment fails to meet that standard. 662 F.2d at 1239.
65. Ruwe Statement, supra note 22.
66. See In re Judge Elmo B. Hunter's Special Grand Jury, 667 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1981); Peti-
tion of the United States for Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co.), 518 F. Supp.
163, 169 (E.D. Wisc. 1981), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 687 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Andrew Pentileakis, Misc. No. 79-30 (D.R.I. Sept. 14, 1979); In re 1974 Term
Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1978); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
581 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing disclosure criteria for civil tax enforcement), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
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Hunter's Special Grand Jury,"7 for example, the Eighth Circuit reversed
a denial of an IRS disclosure request. The district court had found that
the grand jury was used in good faith, that the material sought was rele-
vant to the audit, and that the government had a particularized need for
the information." The district court nevertheless denied the request be-
cause, like the Baggot court, it determined that judicial proceedings were
too remote and speculative to satisfy the "preliminarily to" requirement.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, relying on the dissent in Baggot:
[T]he actual beginning of litigation is always an uncertain matter
which may be deferred or even never begun for any of several rea-
sons. If we read into the rule that the disclosure . . . must be pre-
liminarily to a judicial proceeding bound to happen, we substantially
are curtailing the plain language of the rule .
2. Public Interest Approach
In two well-publicized cases, courts eschewed the literal requirements
of the "judicial proceeding" provision and released grand jury material
without finding pending or contemplated judicial proceedings. Disclosure
was justified as being in the public interest. These cases, which did not
involve administrative agency disclosure requests, nonetheless highlight
the general inadequacy of the "judicial proceeding" provision.
In In re Biaggi,"0 the Second Circuit permitted disclosure of grand jury
materials to the general public despite the absence of a foreseeable judicial
proceeding. 1 Mario Biaggi, a New York City mayoral candidate, sought
release of his own grand jury testimony to rebut a New York Times arti-
cle that reported Biaggi had invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to
a number of questions." Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Friendly
declared that insofar as the rule of secrecy was designed for the protection
of witnesses, Biaggi had waived this protection by seeking disclosure.
Judge Hays, dissenting, characterized the majority's decision as one based
on "the personal views of judges as to what 'the public interest' may
67. 667 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 725 n.2.
69. Id. at 727 (quoting In re Special Feb., 1975 Grand Jury, 662 F.2d 1232, 1241 (7th Cir.
1981) (Pell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Baggot,
102 S. Ct. 2955 (1982) (No. 81-1938)).
70. 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. Id. at 492-93.
72. Biaggi initially sought to have a three judge panel review his testimony and answer a "precise
question." The answer to this artfully phrased question "in all likelihood" would have suggested that
Biaggi did not invoke the privilege. 478 F.2d at 494 (supplemental opinion). Much to his chagrin,
however, the court publicly released an edited version of the transcript, which largely substantiated
the New York Times story.
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require.17 3
Judge Sirica of the District Court for the District of Columbia followed
a similar path a short time later with regard to the "Watergate" grand
jury investigation. In In re Report & Recommendation of June 5, 1972
Grand Jury,"4 he ordered the release of a Watergate grand jury report to
the House of Representatives for use in the House's impeachment investi-
gation of President Nixon.75 Though the judge might have been able to
justify the disclosure by applying the "judicial proceeding" provision, 76
instead he stated that Rule 6(e) merely codified some circumstances under
which grand jury materials could be released. Other circumstances, he ar-
gued, were governed by the common law that existed before the Federal
Rules were adopted.77 Under this reading, failure to meet the "judicial
proceeding" provision would not necessarily block disclosure when the
public interest required it.
The Biaggi and Watergate grand jury opinions stand for something be-
yond the proposition that the "judicial proceeding" provision occasionally
should yield to a compelling need for disclosure. They underscore the
Rule's basic infirmity: its inability to balance properly the need for secrecy
against the need for disclosure. Instead of providing the means by which
courts can strike a proper balance, it has invited calculations concerning
the likelihood of judicial proceedings. Neither the Rule's legislative history
73. Id.
74. 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C.), mandamus denied sub nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
75. The District of Columbia grand jury had delivered a sealed report accompanied by a trans-
mittal memorandum that recommended the report be submitted to the House Judiciary Committee.
The House Judiciary Committee made a formal request for the materials. The President made no
recommendation, and the Special Prosecutor urged that the report be forwarded. 370 F. Supp. at
1221. The only objections to release came from several individuals who were indicted by the same
grand jury and named in the report. Id. at 1221, 1231.
76. Judge Sirica himself analogized the House Committee to a grand jury. Id. at 1230. The
analogy is apt: the House would return an "indictment" to the Senate, and the Senate then would try
the case. It is well-established that disclosure of grand jury materials may be made to other grand
juries. See, e.g., In re 1979 Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F. Supp. 93, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing
cases); In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154, 156 (D.R.I. 1972) (holding grand jury proceeding is a
"judicial proceeding" for the purposes of rule 6(e)).
Some authorities have read the case as permitting disclosure pursuant to the "judicial proceeding"
provision. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Uranium Industry, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
62,798, at 78,644 (D.D.C. 1979) (House Committee activity was "preliminar[y] to or in connection
with a contemplated trial presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States-very much a judi-
cial proceeding.").
On petition for mandamus of Judge Sirica's disclosure order, Judge MacKinnon based his concur-
rence in the majority's denial of the petition on the government's representation at oral argument that
the House investigation was "'preliminar[y] to [and] in connection with a judicial proceeding'. . . in
which due process of law will be available." Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
77. "The Court can see no justification for a suggestion that this codification of a 'traditional
practice' should act, or have been intended to act, to render meaningless an historically proper func-
tion of the grand jury by enjoining courts from any disclosure of reports in any circumstance." 370 F.
Supp. at 1228.
1631
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 1614, 1982
nor sound public policy recommends such calculations. Moreover, no sav-
ing features compensate for this fundamental flaw: whether a disclosure
request is "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding"
says little about the merits of the request. The secrecy policy can be served
by devices better suited to the task.
III. Recommendations
The "judicial proceeding" provision represents a major obstacle to the
efficient performance of administrative agencies' civil enforcement respon-
sibilities. Adopted with little thought about the need for agency access to
grand jury material, the provision has generated a confused and inconsis-
tent body of caselaw. Reform is clearly needed.78 Disclosure should be
permitted "when so directed by a court in the furtherance of justice. ,7 '
78. The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
has proposed certain amendments to rule 6(e). See 91 F.R.D. 301 (1982). The Judicial Conference
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure invited public comment on these amend-
ments. The authors of this Note submitted an earlier draft of the Note to the Judicial Conference and
testified before the Conference in Washington, D.C., on February 10, 1982 (transcript on file with
Yale Law Journal).
The exceptions to the general rule of secrecy proposed by the Judicial Conference read as follows in
pertinent part (new matter is in italics):
(3) Exceptions.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury
may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceed-
ing; or
(ii) when so directed by a court as to books, papers, documents or other objects, upon a
showing which would suffice to compel disclosure of the objects if they had remained in the
custody of the person from whom they were subpoenaed or otherwise obtained for use by the
grand jury;
(iii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before
the grand jury; or
(iv) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to another federal
grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be
made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
91 F.R.D. at 302-03.
Exception (3)(C)(ii) represents a sound attempt to balance the need for secrecy against the need for
disclosure. The materials delineated in this section will be released if the party requesting disclosure
would have been able to compel disclosure of these items had the grand jury investigation never
occurred and had the materials thus remained with their owners. The proposed amendments mean
that "neither [the] person [who turned over materials to the grand jury], nor the person or agency
seeking disclosure has gained a significant tactical advantage by virtue of the fact that the objects have
come into the possession of the grand jury." Advisory Committee Note, 91 F.R.D. 305, 310 (1982);
see also infra pp. 1633-35 (proposing similar standard).
The proposals, however, perpetuate use of the "judicial proceeding" provision for administrative
agencies requesting transcripts and analyses. For all the reasons discussed in this Note this perpetua-
tion of an inadequate phrase is unacceptable.
79. Incorporating this change, rule 6(e) would read (new matter is in italics):
Rule 6. The Grand Jury
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Such an exception, derived from the common law that predated the Fed-
eral Rules,"0 would enable administrative agencies to pursue efficiently
their civil enforcement responsibilities without unduly compromising
grand jury secrecy. The following guides to construction, suggested by the
common law and present practice, would lend content to this exception.
A. Documents
Two reasons for maintaining secrecy after a grand jury investigation
has ended are to encourage voluntary disclosure of information and to
promote full and frank disclosure. Agency requests for subpoenaed docu-
ments, however, implicate neither of these reasons. By definition, a sub-
poenaed document is not voluntarily submitted; and once submitted, it can
never yield anything less than full and frank disclosure. For these reasons,
the guidelines covering requests for subpoenaed documents need not con-
sider the need for grand jury secrecy."1 The guidelines must be attentive,
however, to the possibilities of grand jury abuse and agency overreaching.
Agency disclosure requests covering subpoenaed documents should have
to pass a two-part "good faith" test. First, the agency should demonstrate
that the grand jury was not convened merely to further administrative
discovery. 2 Courts should be particularly wary of cases in which the re-
(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings.
(3) Exceptions.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury may also be made-
(i) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before
the grand jury; or
(ii) when so directed by a court in the furtherance of justice.
80. See supra note 32.
81. One reason for secrecy-protecting the innocent accused-is applicable even to subpoenaed
documents. This reason, however, should not be dispositive in dealing with agency requests. Courts
are free to edit the documents and to impose secrecy requirements on the agencies themselves in order
to protect individuals. See infra pp. 1639-40.
82. In cases in which the grand jury issues an indictment, this requirement is easily met. See In re
July 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (N.D. I1. 1973) (allowing disclosure and noting
that "the fact that the grand jury has already returned multiple-count indictments . . . indicates that
there has been no perversion of grand jury processes"); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 581
F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 1978) ("ITIhe government should be required to demonstrate its bona fides
prior to obtaining a [disclosure] order. This showing is particularly important where the grand jury
fails to return an indictment. In such case, the likelihood of improper use of the grand jury process is
substantially greater. . . ."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
When the grand jury does not issue an indictment, the requesting agency should have to demon-
strate that the criminal investigation was not a mere subterfuge for discovery. Cf In re April 1956
Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956) (denying disclosure because grand jury subpoenas
were being used by Treasury Department to obtain books and records that could not otherwise be
obtained in civil investigation); United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(denying disclosure because purpose of grand jury investigation was "ab initio the exploration of
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questing agency also assisted in the grand jury investigation because of the
danger that the assisting agency used the grand jury as an investigative
arm.83 Second, the agency should demonstrate that the request falls within
its prescribed investigative boundaries. Unlike grand jury subpoenas,
which are virtually immune from judicial challenge, agency subpoenas
must meet four requirements before they will be enforced by a court: (i)
the inquiry must fall within the authority of the agency, 8 (ii) the demand
must not be too indefinite,8 5 (iii) the information requested must be "rea-
sonably relevant," '  and (iv) the information must not be privileged.87 An
agency should be refused access under Rule 6(e) to documents that it
would otherwise be unable to obtain using its own investigative powers. 88
To permit broader disclosure would be to turn the grand jury into an
possible civil claims").
83. See generally Note, supra note 20, at 178-82 (noting subversion of congressional policy and
threat to individual liberty resulting from agency direction of grand jury investigation). In cases in
which the requesting agency was uninvolved in the grand jury investigation (e.g., requests from
nonassisting federal and state agencies), the bad faith issue will seldom arise. For a full discussion of
how use of a type of "good faith" test lessens the risk of grand jury abuse, see Note, supra note 33, at
1683-88.
84. See Administrative Procedure Act § 6(b), 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1976) ("Process, requirement of
a report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand may not be issued, made, or enforced except
at authorized by law.").
A court may also refuse to enforce a subpoena if an investigation was undertaken in bad faith, for
example, for the purposes of harassment. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
85. This requirement aims to prevent agencies from engaging in "fishing expeditions." See United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-42 (1950). A subpoena, therefore, must adequately
describe the materials sought, but this description is "variable in relation to the nature, purposes and
scope of the inquiry." Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). For
example, in Westside Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1953), the Ninth
Circuit upheld a lower court ruling enforcing a subpoena issued by the Office of Price Stabilization
requiring "documents relating to all sales of new automobiles and services performed thereon" during
a designated period. The court declared:
A wide range in investigation is necessary where, as here, the ceiling price regulations are
exceedingly complex and the possibilities of violation or evasion so unlimited that the precise
manner of violation cannot ordinarily be known or even suspected in advance. In such a case,
there is no impossible requirement of meticulous pinpointing of narrow objectives and subjects
of investigation.
Id. at 631.
Courts have narrowed or refused to enforce subpoenas, however, when compliance would be unduly
burdensome. See United States v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (narrowing FTC subpoena requiring inspection of two million documents and more than ten
man-years of work).
86. Detweiler Bros. v. Walling, 157 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 819
(1947). The relevancy requirement is closely related to the specificity requirement. See K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.06, at 188-89 (1958).
87. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked if criminal sanc-
tions may be applied. This privilege, however, will be unavailable for records of corporations and
other organizations, for some records that are required by law, and for witnesses whose testimony is
compelled and who, in return, are granted immunity. See K. DAVIS, supra note 86, § 3.07.
In some instances, both a common law privilege and the Fifth Amendment may be relevant in an
enforcement action. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-05 (1976) (discussing relationship
between Fifth Amendment privilege and common law attorney-client privilege).
88. See United States v. Monsour, 508 F. Supp. 168, 169-70 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (demonstration of
IRS subpoena authority is predicate for rule 6(e) disclosure).
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investigative arm of the administrative agency.
Disclosure of documents that were voluntarily submitted to the grand
jury jeopardizes future voluntary submissions. Therefore the "good faith"
test should be supplemented by a demonstration of "compelling need."
Under a "compelling need" test, similar to that developed in the next sec-
tion, courts would weigh the interest in encouraging voluntary submis-
sions against the importance of access to the documents.
B. Testimony
Unlike requests for documents, agency disclosure requests covering tes-
timony always implicate one reason for grand jury secrecy, encouraging
full and frank disclosure. Requests covering volunteered testimony, more-
over, jeopardize the additional policy of encouraging future voluntary
appearances.
For these reasons, in addition to satisfying the "good faith" test,89 an
agency seeking disclosure of testimony should have to demonstrate a
"compelling need" for that testimony. This test calls for a balancing of the
two possible interests in secrecy against the importance of access to the
testimony. The showing of "compelling need" should be made with par-
ticularity, so that only needed portions of a witness's testimony are
released.90
89. In fact, the second branch of the "good faith" test may prove impossible to apply. Though an
agency may be able to demonstrate that it could use its subpoena power to compel testimony from a
grand jury witness, it could never prove that the substance of the testimony elicited at an administra-
tive hearing would be the same as that elicited in the coercive atmosphere of the grand jury room.
90. In this sense, the existence of a pending judicial proceeding might count as a plus for the
requesting agency. It would tend to focus the agency's request for disclosure and lead to greater
specificity in the request. See supra note 17 (giving examples of particularized requests for witness
testimony for use in judicial proceedings); see also supra note 6 (discussing particularity requirement).
Furthermore, the "compelling need" test for administrative agencies should be less stringent than
the test for private litigants. Disclosure to government agencies in the furtherance of their statutory
duties always entails an offsetting benefit to the public. United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F. Supp.
812, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting additional public policy considerations favoring disclosure when
request made by "government agency empowered to enforce the federal laws"); see also supra note 17
(discussing lower standard of need for agency requests in some district courts). Such a policy of offset-
ting public benefit may be seen to underlie disclosure commonly granted in bar committee and police
disciplinary cases. See, e.g., United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 767 (2nd Cir. 1980) ("A second
factor which we think reduces the burden of the Committee here is that disclosure is not simply
sought by a private person for use in a judicial proceeding but rather by 'an independent public body
charged with the performance of a public duty in a wholly disinterested and impartial manner.' ");
Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1973) ("maintenance of police integrity and
credibility" supports disclosure of testimony by policemen to police board).
In addition, strict statutory requirements prevent the agency from making further disclosure. See
Advisory Committee Note on Proposed Amendment to Rule 6(e), 91 F.R.D. 305, 313 (1982). For an
example of such a statutory restriction, see I.R.C. § 6103 (West 1982) (regarding limits on disclosure
of tax return information).
Disclosure to private litigants generally benefits only private parties, while compromising the public
interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy. Sometimes, however, litigation by private parties may be
an important supplement to agency regulatory activities. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago,
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Evidence of "compelling need" might include a showing of significant
time and money savings. For example, if a grand jury investigation in-
volved numerous witnesses, the agency might demonstrate the cost of lo-
cating, subpoenaing, and interrogating all the witnesses.91 Preventing a
significant threat to the public health or safety would also constitute a
compelling reason to release grand jury testimony. 2 Finally, the "compel-
ling need" test might be met if a witness became unavailable.
C. Analyses
Agency requests for analyses based solely upon subpoenaed documents
should be subject only to the "good faith" test. Similarly, analyses based
solely upon testimony or volunteered documents should be subject to the
"good faith" and "compelling need" tests.
Many analyses, however, are based upon both documents and testi-
mony. An agency seeking such analyses could ask the court to edit out the
references to testimony and volunteered documents, and obtain the edited
analyses through the use of the "good faith" test. If the analyses could not
be edited satisfactorily without using this evidence, the agency would also
have to meet the "compelling need" test.
D. Opportunity to Oppose a Disclosure Request
Courts also must determine whether Rule 6(e) hearings should be ex
parte or adversarial. In 1977, Congress indicated that administrative
agency requests for disclosure should be heard "ex parte so as to preserve,
to the maximum extent possible, grand jury secrecy."9" Nonetheless recent
441 U.S. 677, 703-08 (1979) (private cause of action under Title IX will promote statutory purpose
of eradicating sex discrimination); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (private enforce-
ment of proxy rules a "necessary supplement" to Securities and Exchange Commission action). Yet,
while some courts have lowered the standard of "need" required of agencies in rule 6(e) requests, see
supra note 17, no court has lowered the need standard for private litigants seeking disclosure pursuant
to lawsuits that may supplement agency enforcement. Though beyond the scope of this Note, the same
rationale that supports lowering the "need" standard for administrative agencies may also support
softening the "need" requirement for some private litigants.
91. In In re Judge Elmo B. Hunter's Special Grand Jury, 667 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1981), for
example, the district court found that disclosure "would result in an enormous savings of taxpayer
dollars and time and effort by the government."
92. In United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 62-63 (E.D. Tex. 1980), for example, the court
noted "the importance of an investigation by an administrative licensing agency into the qualifications
of a physician who has pleaded guilty to drug charges." Disclosure to the agency was denied nonethe-
less. Id. at 65.
93. S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
527, 532.
The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee's proposed amendments, see supra note 78, codify
this legislative history by mandating that requests be heard ex parte when "the petitioner is the
government and is seeking disclosure for its own use." 91 F.R.D. 301, 303 (1982). The Advisory
Committee's Note explains the justification for hearing government disclosure requests ex parte by
pointing out that internal regulations limit further disclosure of information disclosed to the govern-
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decisions permit parties to oppose agency requests for disclosure."
As Congress recognized, allowing adversarial hearings in connection
with Rule 6(e) requests could compromise grand jury secrecy. Because an
agency seeking disclosure would have to frame its request with "particu-
larity," 95 a party opposing disclosure may learn about matters considered
by the grand jury. For example, the IRS might ask a court to release
transcripts of the testimony of a grand jury witness for use in an enforce-
ment action against the witness's employer. 6 Permitting the employer to
oppose such a request might lead to intimidation and subornation of the
witness-employee and create a "chilling effect" on future witnesses. 9
Moreover, the employer's appearance in court would offer no offsetting
benefit: unless familiar with the testimony of the witness-employee, the
employer would add little to a court's already considerable knowledge
about the issues presented by a request for disclosure.
In other instances, however, adversarial proceedings can be beneficial.
Indeed, allowing the witness-employee an opportunity to oppose the re-
quest for disclosure would not harm the interests protected by grand jury
secrecy and might result in a more considered resolution of the issues
involved.
This example makes clear that Rule 6(e) hearings need not be ex parte
"to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, grand jury secrecy."
Rather, some opposition should generally be permitted; the exact amount
should depend on the materials requested and on whether the potential
ment. Advisory Committee Note, 91 F.R.D. 305, 313 (1982). Though this "fact" argues in favor of
more freely allowing administrative agencies access to grand jury materials, it provides no support for
the proposition that hearings should be held ex parte when no threat to secrecy exists.
94. See, e.g., Sells, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting congres-
sional intent but permitting adversarial hearing in connection with IRS request for certain docu-
ments), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982) (No. 81-
1032); Petition of United States for Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co.), 510 F.
Supp. 585, 586-87 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (permitting opposition to IRS request); In re April 1977 Grand
Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (noting that rule 6(e) requests are
frequently heard ex parte, but allowing General Motors to oppose an IRS request without discus-
sion). But see In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1982) (invoking congressional
intent to require disclosure request to be heard ex parte); In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury
Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 751 (D. Md. 1978) (same).
95. See supra note 6.
96. See Petition of United States for Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co.),
510 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (involving IRS rule 6(e) request for employee testimony for use
against corporate employer).
97. Cf, e.g., Petrol Stops Northwest v. United States, 571 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1978) (cor-
porate witnesses "vulnerable" to their corporate employers); Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 778
(7th Cir. 1977) ("[W]hen a corporation receives disclosure of its employee's grand jury testimony,
disclosure has been made to the most likely source of retaliation."); In re Cement-Concrete Block, 381
F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (preserving grand jury secrecy in order to lessen witness's fear
of retaliation has "special relevancy" when witnesses are employees or officers of potential
defendants).
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adverse party has had access to these materials."
Grand jury witnesses should always be notified of and permitted to op-
pose requests for transcripts of their testimony, or analyses based on that
testimony. 9 If the witness is not the target of the investigation, providing
the target with notice and an opportunity to be heard would be appropri-
ate only if the target has already had access to that testimony, or those
analyses.100
Notice of and an opportunity to oppose a request for disclosure, how-
ever, should always be given to a target when the request is for subpoe-
naed documents or for analyses based on subpoenaed documents, whether
provided by the target or third parties. 1 Third parties who provided doc-
uments to the grand jury should also be notified and given an opportunity
to oppose disclosure of these materials. 0 2 Adversarial presentation here
would contribute to a full consideration of the issues as well as a feeling of
fairness, and not jeopardize grand jury secrecy.
It is important to note that even if the proceedings are ex parte, and the
agency gains access to the grand jury materials, the target of the investiga-
tion is not precluded from later challenging the agency's actions. 103
98. See In re Doe, 537 F. Supp. 1038, 1041-42 (D.R.I. 1982) (ex parte issue should be deter-
mined on case-by-case basis).
99. See Jachimowski v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973) (permitting policemen to challenge
disclosure of their grand jury testimony for use in disciplinary proceedings against them); In re
Holovachka, 317 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1963) (allowing witness to oppose request for disclosure of his
grand jury testimony); Petition of United States for Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brew-
ing Co.), 510 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (allowing witnesses to oppose IRS request for disclosure
of their testimony).
100. Cf, e.g., Petrol Stops Northwest v. United States, 571 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1978)
(need for secrecy "limited" when corporate employer opposing disclosure of employee's testimony has
in its possession the desired testimony); In re Cement-Concrete Block, 381 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (N.D.
Il1. 1974) (policy behind secrecy rule "partially vitiated" because party opposing disclosure has previ-
ously inspected requested transcripts); Connecticut v. General Motors Corp., 1974-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,138, at 97,080 (N.D. I11. 1974) (as party opposing rule 6(e) disclosure had access to
requested transcripts, "[wihatever secrecy would normally attach to them has in effect already been
abrogated").
101. Requests for documents that were submitted voluntarily or for analyses based on such mater-
ials raise concerns about discouraging future voluntary submissions. See supra pp. 1634-35. Hence,
targets generally should not be permitted to oppose requests for those materials.
102. See In re Doe, 537 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (D.R.I. 1982) (standing to object given to owners of
documents "inasmuch as these persons are already aware of. . .the documents' contents"). In addi-
tion, third parties or targets ought to be permitted to move that disclosure proceedings be held in
camera on grounds that a request covers sensitive materials. Cf Petition of United States for Disclo-
sure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co.), 510 F. Supp. 585, 588 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (re-
jecting Miller's request to view grand jury materials subpoenaed from Miller's largest competitor,
because "[cloncern over competitors viewing sensitive information is so great in this industry").
103. Evidence improperly obtained from a grand jury may be suppressed at subsequent civil pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 584 F.2d 1366, 1370 (6th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979); In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 581 F.2d 1103, 1110 n.16 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 971 (1979); Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Cohen v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 312, 322-24 (1981).
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E. Court Orders
Courts should disclose only those materials that have met the "good
faith," and if appropriate, the "compelling need" guidelines. Courts
should also carefully edit materials before release in order to minimize
incursions on grand jury secrecy.'0°
In addition to tailoring disclosure orders as narrowly as possible, courts
should impose the following four requirements on an agency's subsequent
use of disclosed grand jury materials:
1) The agency should not give grand jury material to private parties
or other agencies. If another agency requires the material, it should have
to request disclosure from the court separately.
2) The receiving agency should not publicize disclosed information,
except at administrative hearings, where the target is given an opportunity
to challenge the information." 5 This requirement would reduce the
problems that are associated with grand jury reports.'0 6
3) Disclosed material should be used only for the purposes stated in
the disclosure request. If the agency wishes to use the material for another
purpose, it should have to return to the court and obtain permission. 107
4) Courts should specify a time period during which the agency must
104. In In re Disclosure of Testimony, 580 F.2d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1978), for example, the court
ordered disclosure in two stages to four administrative bodies investigating official misconduct. First,
after reading the entire grand jury transcript, which consisted of testimony of more than 100 wit-
nesses, the court provided the movants with the names and addresses of those grand jury witnesses
that testified about areas over which the individual applicants had jurisdiction.
Following the release of these names and addresses, the movants interviewed the named witnesses
and provided the court with statements taken from each witness. The court compared these statements
with the testimony of the witnesses before the grand jury and found that two of the witnesses had
refused to make statements, five had given statements which contained material omissions of informa-
tion given to the grand jury in their testimony, and one had furnished a statement substantially at
odds with his grand jury testimony. Accordingly, the court authorized the further disclosure of copies
of specified pages from the grand jury transcript that contained testimony either omitted from or
significantly at variance with statements made to the applicants or testimony of persons who refused to
give any statement to the applicants.
105. There exists sufficient caselaw to alleviate concerns that the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), may force agencies to release grand jury materials that should not be
made available to the public. See, e.g., Valenti v. United States Dep't of Justice, 503 F. Supp. 230
(E.D. La. 1980) (grand jury materials, although in agency's possession, were court records and there-
fore not covered by FOIA); Hiss v. Department of Justice, 441 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding
that FOIA does not affect grand jury secrecy); Chamberlain v. Alexander, 419 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.
Ala. 1976) (FOIA exemption covers grand jury testimony), af1"d in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 827
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1980).
106. See supra pp. 1623-25.
107. For example, if the IRS obtains a disclosure order to facilitate a tax investigation against
Smith, it cannot also use the information garnered in this manner against Jones. To proceed against
Jones with these materials, the agency must seek a new court order. Though establishing "good faith"
may involve only a pro forma recitation of the facts earlier found sufficient in the Smith request,
"compelling need" can be measured only with reference to the new use to which the agency wishes to
put the materials. Moreover, the agency may have to notify Jones and give him an opportunity to
oppose the new use of the materials. See supra pp. 1636-38.
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initiate an enforcement proceeding pursuant to its Rule 6(e) request. If a
proceeding is not instituted within that period, the grand jury material
and any copies thereof should be returned to the court. Disclosed material
should also have to be returned after it is used in a civil enforcement
proceeding. A new court order would be required for any subsequent use.
This guideline will prevent Rule 6(e) disclosures from contributing to
"dossiers" with which administrative agencies might harass the targets of
their investigations.'0 8
Conclusion
Rule 6(e) poses barriers to administrative agency access to grand jury
material that are suggested neither by the legislative history of the Rule
nor by the policies that underlie grand jury secrecy. Furthermore, such
barriers hamper the efforts of administrative agencies to carry out their
mandated civil enforcement responsibilities. The guidelines in this Note
remain attentive to the policies that underlie grand jury secrecy but at the
same time recognize that, on occasion, public policy argues strongly in
favor of disclosure.
108. Cf Note, supra note 20, at 179 (citing several instances of use of administrative agencies for
harassment of political enemies during Nixon Administration).
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